

F.B.I.

Speeches

Legality file

At the request of the DCI, Channel 26 is giving the DCI a chance to comment on "The Rise And Fall of The C.I.A." Taping time for this commentary — with [] and a colleague will probably be Friday or Saturday if DCI can work it in to his schedule. It will be a 15 minute piece which must be aired Sunday as part of the time available for Ch. 26's member recruitment drive.

STAT

Can you run your eye over this script (from the N.Y. showing earlier this year but, I believe, basically the same) and find untruths, misleading statements, tendentious remarks, etc? Can you return them by noonish Friday? The DCI has asked for an "annotated copy" of the "Rise & Fall" transcript.

AT AMT
11 Dec 75 - 1230pm

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Rise and Fall of the CIA STATION WNEW TV

DATE September 21, 1975 9:00 PM CITY New York

SUBJECT Full Text

ANNOUNCER: The Central Intelligence Agency was established in the 1950's. Off and on, ever since that time, there has been some debate about the role of the conduct and organization in a democratic society such as ours. And that debate rocketed into prominence and into all American's awareness during the Watergate revelations, when it was revealed that the CIA had provided the White House "plumbers" with equipment used to perform illegal acts. And it was also revealed that some White House employees had actually been CIA agents.

Last May a British television company, Grenada TV, produced three half-hour reports on the intelligence agency, focusing on the facts that came to the surface. Grenada played the records, interviewed former agents and employees. And those three reports were broadcast over the British commercial television network.

Tonight we have all three reports, edited into one program. Because of the nature of the intelligence work, Metro-media cannot document the content of these reports, not had we control over their production.

We did invite the CIA to view the material and present its own comments. The director of the agency declined our invitation.

Now, "The Rise and Fall of the CIA," a probing report by Grenada Television.

POLICEMAN: What are you all doing here?

MAN: We are making a film for television.

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POLICEMAN: ...television. If anyone wants -- if you want to photograph it from the "U" (?) channel, you contact that agency. If they give you permission, then you can come down and photograph it.

NARRATOR: The building the Virginia police don't want us to film is the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA. It's America's equivalent of our MI-6 or the Russian KGB. But, although they don't encourage the publicists, Americans make little attempt to hide their spy headquarters, and in the last few months they have had a lot of attention. Accusations that the CIA has been involved in domestic spying and the assassinations of foreign leaders have led to investigations by Congress and by a special committee under Vice President Nelson Rockefeller.

Tonight, Photo (?) Action looks at the world's biggest spy organization, from its small beginnings right up to the present controversy about its secret activities which today it finds increasingly difficult to keep secret.

In telling the story of the CIA we are going to rely in part on the accounts of men who have played a central role in planning or executing the agency's operations. Some are former agents who have become disillusioned or whose cover has been blown. Others still have a close relationship with the agency.

One of the most important is Tom Braden. He was at the center of the fast-expanding CIA. As assistant to director Allen Dulles, Tom Braden ran many of the agency's worldwide operations.

TOM BRADEN: This is the crossroads of Virginia. Down the road behind me is the Central Intelligence Agency, or the factory, or the firm, as those who work there call it. Every day 16,000 people come down these roads, past the huge green signs that say, "Central Intelligence Agency." "Right" or "Left." Take their passes out, show them to the guards and go to work in their office.

CIA has weather experts, farm experts, railroad experts, who can tell how the railroads are running and what would happen if they broke down. It's a vast, vast bureaucracy.

So if it is big, and most people think it's far too big and encumbers in its own bigness. It doesn't really do any harm, this oversight of intelligence. The trouble is that in this building also are the leaders of the people who run the covert operations for CIA, or the "dirty tricks," as they are called. And that is what all the fuss is about.

NARRATOR: Earlier this year, in the growing public concern, President Ford had Vice President Rockefeller sworn in to head an investigation of the CIA and discover the truth behind the stories of covert activities, the so-called "dirty tricks."

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It's this covert, or undercover, activity which has got the CIA into so much trouble. The secret financing of propaganda groups, the manipulation of trade unions overseas, the illegal spying inside America itself, stories of links with the Mafia killers and possible involvement in the murder of the leaders of other countries.

Rockefeller reported last week that the CIA had indeed engaged in illegal activity, including spying on critics of the government inside America. However, wilder rumors of CIA involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy were firmly discounted.

President Ford made his position clear a few days ago.

PRESIDENT GERALD FORD: I am totally opposed to political assassination. This Administration has not and will not use such means as instruments of national policy.

NARRATOR: But the sensitive section of the Rockefeller reports, dealing with possible CIA involvement in political assassinations has not been published. Instead it was passed on to a committee of Congress, under Senator Frank Church, which is now actively investigating the strange role of the Central Intelligence Agency in international politics.

In the early post-war years, Tom Braden specialized in the more sophisticated forms of covert action.

BRADEN: ...in all the way from paying an editor to run a story in a newspaper -- it might be planting a rumor in a street crowd in some less developed [unintelligible]. That would be a covert action, a rather innocent one probably. Or it could be funding a magazine which might go out of business and whose opinions you wish to distribute widely. And it would go all the way to landing paratroopers in the dead of the night in somebody's palace, seizing a body somewhere, or even an assassination.

NARRATOR: Founded just after the last war, the CIA was given a competent start by men like these, veterans of America's wartime OSS, Office of Strategic Service, and forerunner of the CIA. These retired CIA intelligence men still meet regularly at reunions like this one in New York.

America's covert attempts to combat Communist activity during the Cold War years owed much of its success to these veterans of the hot war against Germany and Japan. The new agency was to benefit greatly from the wartime intelligence skills learned in combat by these OSS veterans.

OSS VETERAN: We got behind enemy lines in Malaya, which is now Malaysia. And, as a matter of fact, we got behind enemy lines all the way down from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore.

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SECOND OSS VETERAN: ...railroads, the transportation system, shooting up arriving troops. And I said, which I am entitled to say, "What is the chance of coming back?" and they give you a percentage. My percentage about 125 of not coming back. Now, that's a little high, 75 you expect. Because when you go into a country like that you don't know what you are running into.

NARRATOR: Peter Sichelle had the experience and sophistication which was to be the hallmark of many a successful CIA strategy. And educated Central European, he -- in America's OSS intelligence organization.

PETER SICHELLE: The key people in CIA all were old OSS officers. There was no reason for it. They had the experience, they had the know-how. They also had the enormous amount of motivation which carried over into the initially anti-Communist wars.

INTERVIEWER: So the anti-facists automatically became anti-Communists?

SICHELLE: Yes, it was an anti-totalitarian movement, ideologically, that started with Hitler's practice, and then rolled over to anti-Communist, because, after all, we saw the Eastern European, experience being absorbed by Russia, and it was very east. Ideologically, to follow from one to the other side.

INTERVIEWER: You entered the CIA. What did you do there?

PICHELLE: I was in Germany for a number of years.

INTERVIEWER: What were you doing there?

PICHELLE: I was the top CIA man there, in Berlin.

INTERVIEWER: [Question inaudible]

PICHELLE: In Berlin.

NARRATOR: Many early CIA men were liberal East Coast intellectuals.

FORMER CIA MAN: Well, we lived around here. This is Georgetown, a suburb of Washington, with big houses. They don't look like much, but they ran for a hundred to three hundred thousand dollars. When you think of -- when the average person thinks of the CIA type or the MI-6 type as this -- with a fur-lined (?) and a gun in his back. These guys were open-counenaced college boys who lived in houses like this and sent their kids to private schools, played tennis on weekends and lived cleanly and, well...

SECOND FORMER CIA MAN: Things that OSS had done during the war, many of the projects were still going on, so CIA picked

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them up. In addition, began right away to continue the kind of derring-do operations of OSS. One of the first operations of the CIA was the famous abortive parachute jump into Albania, which was brought to an untimely end by a Russian spy in the British Intelligence service, Toby.

NARRATOR: Kin Toby's treason passed the death sentence on the CIA's secret invasion in 1949, a doomed attempt to stop that country going Communist. Hundreds of agents were parachuted into Albania, only to be caught and killed by the Communists, alerted by the double-agent Toby. Albania was a costly failure. The story was to be repeated throughout Eastern Europe, for with the division between the Allies and Russia, large areas were now in the Soviet orbit. There were kidnappings in Bulgaria, parachute drops in the Ukraine, and infiltrations into Eastern Germany. But all to avail. The CIA failed to loosen Stalin's grip. The campaign to roll back the Iron Curtain was a failure.

But the CIA had also begun to penetrate the Iron Curtain in a more subtle way. From West Germany, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcast a skillfull mixture of news -- and anti-Communist propaganda into Eastern Europe. The broadcasts encouraged the people to resist the Russians.

SPOKESMAN: What a tragedy, so far as the agency's (?) Cold War experience, with the message of Radio Free Europe that they were going to push the Iron Curtain back. They deny now that they gave the message that much force. But in fact they did. They urged people to rise. And there area lot of dead bodies in East Germany and Poland and in Hungary to prove. They didn't push the Iron Curtain back. They kept saying they were going to.

NARRATOR: But if the CIA failed to pry Eastern Europe from the Russians, the more sophisticated agents, many of them liberal and some ex-socialists, were much more successful in cancelling the advance of communism in the West. In Western Europe this became a CIA priority, especially in Italy and France. In Marseilles, the CIA even imported Sicilians to break a Communist dockside strike. Vast funds were organized by Tom Braden to promote ventures like anti-Communist unions.

BRADEN: Journalists were a target. Labor unions a particular target. And that was one of the activities in which the Communists spent the most money. They set up a successful Communist labor union in France right after the war. We countered it with the Force Rouvier (?). They set up a very successful Communist labor union in Italy and we countered it with the CISL.

NARRATOR: Apart from their efforts in Europe, the CIA went on to suport anti-Communist trade unions around the world. Scores of labor institutions were financed by the agency, often without their knowledge.

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One of these, the American Institute for Free Labor Development, even helped to bring down governments in Brazil and Guyana.

INTERVIEWER: What were the targets in Europe for CIA money?

BRADEN: Communist fronts, or that -- those elements of population in any country which we thought susceptible to Communist influence. For example, we had a vast project targeted at the intellectuals. The battle of Picasso's mind, if you will. And the Communists set up fronts in which they effectively enticed a great many, particularly the French intellectuals, to join. We tried to set up a counterfront.

NARRATOR: The battle for the support of intellectuals was waged with the battle for the allegiance of workers. Again, it was a worldwide operation. Hundreds of cultural, educational and professional organizations were supported by the CIA and in the propaganda battles of the Cold War the Communists lost ground rapidly.

One of the most important CIA fronts was the Congress for Cultural Freedom, CCS, based on Paris. One journal set up and financed by the CCS was a British magazine, Encounter. It was to provide a platform for progressive but non-Communist intellectuals. Tom Braden was responsible for its financing.

BRADEN: I think the budget for the Congress for Cultural Freedom one year that I had charge of it was about \$809,000, which included, of course, the subsidy for the Congress's magazine, Encounter. That doesn't mean -- that doesn't mean that everybody that worked for Encounter or everybody that worked for Encounter or everybody who wrote for Encounter knew anything about it. Most of the people who worked for Encounter, and all but one of the men who ran it had no idea that it was paid for by the CIA.

NARRATOR: It was important to the CIA that respectable journals like Encounter appeared to be free of outside influence. To ensure this, the American spies employed an elaborate secret system of financing them. Funds for Encounter came from the Congress for Cultural Freedom, CCS, which in turn got its money from Albert Sell (?) Foundation in New Jersey. Albert Sell was in turn given money by the Price Fund, which finally got its cash directly from the CIA.

This sophisticated undercover operation used thousands of organizations as conduits, channels for CIA money. This highly effective system was kept secret all through the fifties and most of the sixties. But the cover was blown by American newspaper investigations in 1966 and '67.

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In Britain these organizations were revealed as recipients of CIA money. These revelations deeply embarrassed intellectuals associated with the operations who were unaware of their CIA connection.

However, the CIA's secrets had been kept through the most critical years of the Cold War. In Washington, the CIA's propaganda battle for hearts and minds was judged a great success. Thus, the agency increased enormously in strength and influence under the active patronage of two brothers who made anti-communism an American crusade.

This man, John Foster Dulles, was to shape American foreign policy in the fifties under President Eisenhower. His brother, Allen Dulles, a master spy of World War II, was made head of the CIA. The agency's enormous power, which we're now becoming to regret, was bestowed on it during the fifties, partly by the closeness of the Dulles brothers.

BRADEN: Well, I had some project that had to do with the publication, I think it was in France. I went over to the French Desk in the State Department, saw the chief of the French Desk, told him I was going to do this in France and he objected. I remember I was astonished because it was not a very -- it was not a very important expenditure. It was a few hundred thousand dollars for a publication, and the reason for doing it. So there was every good reason for doing it. But I didn't argue with the man because I knew what would happen. And I went back and I went up to the Director's office and I said, "Allen, the French Desk in the State Department doesn't want to do this." And Allen said, "What?" Picked up the phone: "Foster, one of your people seems to be a little less than cooperative."

NARRATOR: Under the Dulles brothers, the CIA's relentless attack on Communist influence, real or imagined, reached into almost every country in the world. The secret funding of thousands of organizations became so sophisticated that in the end the CIA even financed Communist publications.

BRADEN: There is an American Communist newspaper in the United States called the Daily Workers. For many years the CIA subsidized the Daily Worker. Not entirely, but we bought enough subscriptions to make sure that the thing wouldn't go out of existence, which it threatened from year to year to do.

INTERVIEWER: What was the point of that?

BRADEN: Well, there's a clear example, I suppose, of not wanting -- of wanting to make sure your enemy is in place. The Daily Worker is an organ which has delivered the straight Communist line, and it was an example of what you say, it was a newspaper which mirrored the enemy, and we didn't want to lose any of it.

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NARRATOR: Under the Dulles Brothers, the CIA was given so much power, money and freedom of action that normal political control became almost impossible.

Tom Braden was Allen Dulles's assistance in those free-wheeling years.

INTERVIEWER: Did the CIA ever have to account for money it spent?

BRADEN: No, it never accounted -- it never had to account for the money it spent, except to the President if the President wanted to know how much money it was spending. But, otherwise, the funds were not only unaccountable but they were unvouchered, so there was really no means of checking it, unvouchered funds meaning expenditures that are not -- don't have to be accounted for.

INTERVIEWER: Is that the only agency, government agency, which had that kind of system?

BRADEN: Yes, that was the only one, because the other things that were secret, Secret Service, and so forth, were on very tight budgets. But if the Director of the CIA wanted to extend a present, say, to someone in Europe, a labor leader. Suppose he just thought this man can use fifty thousand dollars; he's working well and doing a good job -- he could hand it to him and never account to anybody.

INTERVIEWER: Were there a lot of handouts like that?

BRADEN: Oh, yes, a lot. I don't mean to imply that there were a great many of them that were handed out as Christmas presents. They were handed out for work well performed or in order to perform work well.

INTERVIEWER: For influence...

BRADEN: One you influenced then, yes. Politicians in Europe, particularly right after the war, got a lot of money from the CIA.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think the CIA was too -- for its own good?

BRADEN: Since it was unaccountable, it could hire as many people as it wanted. It never had to say to any committee -- no committee ever said to it, you can only have so many men. It could do exactly as it pleased. It made promotions, therefore, for every contingency. It could hire armies. It could buy banks. There was simply no limit to the money it could spend and no limit to the people it could hire, and no limit to the activities it could decide were necessary to conduct the war, the secret war.

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INTERVIEWER: And you say it could have any money it wanted. Do you really mean that?

BRADEN: Yes, any amount of money.

INTERVIEWER: So you're saying the CIA became like a multi-national.

BRADEN: It was a multi-national; yes. Maybe it was one of the first.

NARRATOR: Given what was virtually a blank check, the CIA just grew and grew. John Marks, formerly a State Department intelligence officer himself, and now a critic of the CIA, has compelled a remarkable list of their secret commercial interests. It's now clear that, over the years, in order to make itself into a more powerful intelligence organization, the CIA also turned itself into a profitable multi-national business.

In downtown Washington, John Marks showed us some of the companies used by the CIA.

MARKS: The CIA is an extremely big business. It had several hundreds of proprietary companies spread all over the world. And here in Washington, D.C., I mean if you drive around, you see CIA companies.

NARRATOR: The CIA's biggest civilian fronts are its airlines. Situated discreetly among the commercial airline offices in downtown Washington is the holding company for the secretly-owned air company.

SPEAKER: The CIA operates virtually the largest network of airplanes in the world, of airplanes in the world. And you have a ... that, the CIA companies in this building, where the Pacific Corporation is the holding company, and then you have Air America, you have another one called Pacific Engineering Company, there's one here called the Tide Pacific Services Company, LTD., another one called Civil Air Transport over there. And they've used these CIA airlines in the past to fly rice and refugees in Vietnam, to fly secret bombing missions against North Vietnamese troops in Laos. They even have Air America planes in Laos flying some opinion at times. I mean these airlines are available for any kind of clandestine mission of that the CIA wants to send them on.

NARRATOR: Today, the CIA civilian air fleet is the largest in the world. But its operations were extended to combat missions in the Third World complex and grew throughout the 1960.

But the CIA's extensive air operations were one sign of its power which was hard to hide.

INTERVIEWER: Which is the biggest airline of these?

SPEAKER: Air America is the biggest airline. During the Vietnam war they had about forty million dollars a year in Defense Department contracts. They had about 125 pilots flying. I think, in terms of world airlines, Air America is in the top ten, in terms of number of planes flown.

NARRATOR: While the CIA extended its air operations, it also built up its own arms dumps around the world. A former Pentagon official told World in Action that this installation in England was used for years as a CIA arms base.

Colonel Prouty was for nine years the Pentagon liaison officer between the U.S. military and the CIA. We tried to check the truth of Colonel Prouty's story, but our own Minister of Defense and the CIA, in keeping with their normal practice, both refused to comment.

COLONEL PROUTY: At Cheddington, the CIA had what we called a storage depot. There they kept ammunition, rifles, mortars, all kinds of equipment from all over the world. After the '56 Suez campaign they acquired, I believe from Israel, captured weapons that had been given to the Egyptians, Czech-built weapons, various foreign weapons. And those were kept stored in bunkers on the Cheddington base.

INTERVIEWER: When was the last time you were at that base?

COLONEL PROUTY: I was there several times during '58, '59 probably the last time 1960. I kept active in that work until '63 and I am quite sure we were drawing on that base as late as '63. They had a tremendous amount of equipment there.

INTERVIEWER: Would you describe it as one of the biggest bases in Europe of that kind?

COLONEL PROUTY: For the CIA, yes. It was their biggest base.

NARRATOR: In America, the CIA finds it's more difficult to keep its secret bases secret. We simply flew over this CIA base in the woodlands of Virginia, Camp Perry. Here now agents learn techniques of both sabotage and espionage. America has no equivalent of our Official Secrets Act to stop former agents or journalists making public information which the authorities might prefer to keep hidden. Indeed, in America their freedom is protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution.

Another ex-agent speaking out publicly is Joe Maggio, who was trained in parliamentary techniques at Camp Perry. Again, we can neither confirm nor refute Maggio's account of what goes on

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there.

MAGGIO: They have their entire -- one part of their entire demolition plant there. And they have the entire -- obstacle courses there. Now, I would not know the total acreage, except to say that it's huge. They have a large airstrip there. They have enough water facilities to operate a small maritime force, although the main maritime force is not there. They train the maritime people there.

There are specific areas at Camp Perry you cannot go to, sterile areas, safehouse (?) areas, where they bring in specific individuals for safekeeping. Some come and never leave. That's hearsay and I cannot say that I have been a part of any of that. But I know that the people who discuss this with me are not as irreverent as I am, and they discuss this with a lot more sincerity than most people take, and I discussed it very reluctantly. But there are, have been, many instances at Camp Perry where Camp Perry acted as judge, jury and executioner.

INTERVIEWER: If the CIA wanted a particular kind of person to do some kind of dirty tricks, could they get them?

MAGGIO: You're asking me if the person is unavailable but was in jail.

INTERVIEWER: Supposing he was in jail.

MAGGIO: Yes, they would get him. They would make a deal with him. They would say, all right. A,B,C,D, you come, you cheat (?), you do these things, and you step out of line once you go back to jail. But we are giving you a shot by a Senate committee.

The story of CIA coups around began in the mid-fifties. As the British and French empires withdraw from Africa, the Middle East and Indochina, new left-leaning governments began to emerge. A responsible American President, still fighting the Cold War, was to try to topple some of these governments.

Tonight we look at three different techniques the CIA used in bringing down governments in Iran, Guyana and Cuba.

The CIA's first success in bringing down a government came in Iran in 1953. It had to follow one basic rule: The U.S. Government must not be seen to be involved.

ROOSEVELT: There was some discussion and Foster Dulles went around the table, and the only person on the State Department side whom I can remember taking any kind of very specific position was Ambassador Rendix who was back from this meeting, and he said that he wanted to know some of the details. He felt that this was a critical departure from diplomatic tradition but he thought it was required by the situation. He wanted to

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approve it and he wanted to know as little about it as possible.

NARRATOR: In 1953, Iran was ruled, as now, by the Shah. But in those days he was young and inexperienced, with little power. Mossadegh and his Nationalist Party controlled the country. Roosevelt's plan was to get the Shah to force confrontation with Mossadegh in which the Iranian people would encourage to rally to the Shah. So Roosevelt and a small team of CIA men entered the country illegally and went underground.

ROOSEVELT: Our agents consist now, I would say, six or eight at the most. And the money was available, well, I can't remember. But I think we had -- we probably had seven or eight hundred thousand dollars available, and which we used during the course of the operation maybe ten thousand dollars.

INTERVIEWER: Are you saying that only ten thousand dollars and six or eight agents were needed to mount a whole operation of that nature?

ROOSEVELT: Well, the Iranians were organizing themselves, and really all they needed was support and, to some extent, professional guidance.

NARRATOR: To bring about the coup, Roosevelt simply looked for the forces opposed to Mossadegh. He found them in the Iranian Army. The CIA's choice to replace Mossadegh was General Zahadi. To start the crisis, Roosevelt wrote a letter, at which he got the Shah to sign, replacing Mossadegh and putting General Zahadi in his place.

At first the plan went badly wrong. Mossadegh refused to accept the decree. Instead, his supporters took to the streets and rioting, demanding that the Shah step down himself. With events beyond his control, the Shah fled to Rome.

Then Roosevelt and his agents pulled off an extraordinary feat. In three days they manipulated the anti-Shah demonstrations into anti-Mossadegh riots.

ROOSEVELT: Well, it was not difficult at all because the hard core of the Iranian element was there and ready to move. And what they needed was advice, some assistance, some physical support, occasional small amounts of money.

NARRATOR: Roosevelt and his agents wanted to persuade the Iranian army to begin arresting the Mossadegh supporters on the streets. He did this by lending them U.S. military equipment. Later, Major General George Stewart recently testified before Congress on how the coup was engineered.

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STEWART: When this crisis came on and the thing was about to collapse, we violated our normal criteria. And, among other things we did, we provided the army immediately on any emergency basis. The guns that they had in their hands, the trucks that they rode in, the armored cars that they drove through the streets, were all furnished through the military defense assistance program.

NARRATOR: With the army arresting Mossadegh's demonstrator's Roosevelt and his CIA agents went around the bazaars of Teheran, giving out dollars to people out on the streets shouting pro-Shah slogans. In just three days the CIA swung the crowds away from Mossadegh to the Shah. Mossadegh himself was arrested by the army and the Shah returned in triumph from Rome.

This coup had been the CIA's favorite kind of operation: political intervention. Roosevelt and a handful of CIA men changed the government by organizing revolution on the streets. Three hundred people died during the rioting, but the involvement of the CIA was kept secret.

Tom Braden was a director in the CIA's clandestine section.

INTERVIEWER: What was the psychological effect on the agency on that operation?

BRADEN: Well, it was not the first foreign success in the dirty tricks department. But it was certainly one of the -- it was certainly the first big one. And, since it was a complicated, dangerous, difficult operation, and it was performed so successfully, with such little use of manpower and very little use of money, that it probably gave the agency its first pair of long trousers.

NARRATOR: The coup was as far-sighted as it was bold. Today, twenty years later, the Shah is America's fondest ally in the Middle East. With his own revenues, he has turned Iran into an armed fortress against communism.

The CIA's part in the operation began to leak in the 1960's. But one aspect of the story has never been told before. According to a highly-placed CIA official talking to World in Action, it was the British Foreign Office and MI-6 which asked the CIA to topple Mossadegh. In accordance with their normal practice, they have refused to comment on this report. But, in any case, the coup didn't do Britain much good. The British government lost its monopoly on Iranian oil and the U.S. picked up forty percent of the Shah's oil contracts.

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Full of confidence, the CIA wanted Roosevelt to repeat his operations in other problem areas of the Middle East. One proposal, again reportedly originating from the British, was for the CIA to get rid of Egypt's General Nasser. The British invasion of Suez had just failed and the CIA was asked to help.

A former deputy director of the agency told World in Action that the plan included a CIA attempt on Nasser's life. We have no way of knowing whether the CIA tried to put the plan into operation.

Roosevelt himself was doubtful about it from the start.

ROOSEVELT: The proposal was that an operation be mounted against Nasser, and the U.S. Government's position was very reserved. And we said we agreed in principle that this would be a good idea but we were not satisfied that appropriate conditions existed to carry it out successfully.

INTERVIEWER: What was being suggested, that Nasser should be removed?

ROOSEVELT: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: How?

ROOSEVELT: Replaced by a palace revolution. And of course we didn't see the -- we couldn't identify the palace revolutionaries who were willing to undertake it with any chance of success. There are always people who are, you know, willing to have a crack at something, but you've got to judge their capability.

INTERVIEWER: Who was pressing it?

ROOSEVELT: Actually the British.

NARRATOR: When World in Action contacted the British Foreign Office they again told us this was not the kind of story on which they could comment.

(Music)

It was in another area of British influence, the colony of British Guyana that the CIA used its second technique for toppling unfriendly governments. There the CIA's weapon was the labor movement, and its methods, the general strike.

The CIA made secret use of the network of trade union organizations throughout Latin America. Working through unions is one way of avoiding suspicion.

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Phillip Agee, then a CIA officer and now an active critic, operated in three Latin American countries.

AGEE: The CIA had many purposes of use of these trade union agents. On the one hand, of course, they were supposed to build up their trade union organization as a legitimate -- with all the appearances of a legitimate trade union organization. But the final purpose of all these trade union organizations was political. That is, the trade union structure was to be developed so that it could serve better political purposes of the CIA.

NARRATOR: This method was used with greatest success in the British colony of Guyana, on the northern shoulder of South America. The CIA's target was British Guyana's Marxist Prime Minister Dr. Cheddi Jagan. Despite British opposition, Jagan had won two elections, in 1953 and '57. Independence was on its way and Jagan's government threatened to nationalize several British and American holdings in Guyana's major industries, sugar and bauxite.

In 1961 Jagan won again. And the CIA decided to act. A few weeks after the election this man arrived in Guyana's capital, Georgetown. His name, Howard McKay. His job, field representative of an international trade union secretariat, the Public Services International, based in London. Little-known trade secretariats like this represent workers in a particular industry, in this case government employees.

In the early 1960's the CIA was making good use of such organizations. McKay said he had come to establish an educational office in Georgetown. In fact he was a CIA agent. McKay was to finance and mastermind Jagan's overthrow.

The first step was to build local support. McKay lectured to a crash training course for 45 handpicked trade unionists. Eight were sent to Washington for special training in the new trade unionism, CIA style. All were members of Guyana's racial minority, the black Afro Guyanese. The CIA relied heavily on racial differences to attack Jagan's predominantly Indian government.

McKabe was joined by other trade unionists from America. Philip Agee, the former CIA agent, knew most of them.

AGEE: We had so many it's sometimes hard to name all the names. But the principal people involved were Serafino Rimwaldi -- he was the inter-American representative of the American Federation of Labor. William Boherty was a career agent in the CIA. Andrew McClellan was still another. Ric

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union was the Fruit and Drink Workers International. There was Gerald O'Keefe, for example, who was the representative of the Retail Clerks International. There must have been ten or fifteen very important American trade unionists who were working for the CIA in the CIA's trade union programs in Latin America.

NARRATOR: Nineteen Sixty-two. Financed by the CIA, the anti-Jagan campaign got underway. It began on February the 16th, with a series of strikes. The fighting that followed soon became racial rioting. It was known as Black Friday. The toll was four dead and a hundred injured. Hobs set much of central Georgetown at fire. At the height of the rioting, Howard McKabe had himself photographed helping to treat the injured.

This was the first stage in a campaign that would cost 170 lives and cost 40 million dollars worth of damage. The CIA campaign was stepped up the following year. With McKabe behind them, the anti-Jagan section of the trade union movement called a general strike. Severe food shortages developed and many of Jagan's Indian supporters were reduced to picking through the uncollected garbage of Georgetown for their food. In a country already poor, Jagan's government hoped the strike would last no more than a month. In fact, it lasted three times that long.

The twenty thousand strikers were receiving strike pay and free food. This support was said to be coming from sympathetic unions abroad. In fact, much of it came from the CIA.

But, despite the strike, Jagan hung on. In the summer of 1963 the campaign begun by the CIA became an organized program of arson and bombing. These police gazette(?) papers were prepared during the strike and obtained from sources close to the Jagan government. The British government, still in overall charge, still independent, banned their publication in Guyana.

They named Jagan's opponent and the present Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham, together with Guyana's -- Richard Ishmael, as organizers of a campaign of arson and bombing. The report also names one of the CIA's American trade unionists. It reports: This organization is financed by Gerald D. O'Keefe.

When the strike was in its tenth week, a British TUC official was sent out to arbitrate. One of the welcoming team was CIA agent Howard McKabe. The arbitrator sent by the British was Robert Willis of the TUC General Council.

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WILLIS: It was certainly one of the longest -- in fact, they both stated the fact that it was the longest general strike in the world. I don't know what they have to be proud about over that, but they were. But it was managed, I think, and maintained largely by the inclusion of a considerable amount of money. There must have been. You can't run a strike in a country like that for ten weeks without some heavy finance. In fact, Dr. Jagan mentioned to me the amount of over a million dollars during the course of the ten weeks being brought into the country.

And of course the fact that the American McKabe was at the back of it. In the light of later knowledge, we realized, of course, how active he was, CIA wise, and that his union position was largely a front behind which he could bring in the finance and do the necessary coordination of the strike action that was carrying on and had been carrying on for ten weeks.

NARRATOR: Willis's intervention helped bring the strike to an end. But the damage had been done. It needed only one last push, a change of election rules by the British government, and Jagan was toppled.

His successor was Forbes Burnham, named in the police reports as one of the men who helped organize the riots. Under Burnham, Guyana was granted independence by the British government. World in Action has since made three programs documenting the massive election rigging by which Burnham has held on to the power the CIA helped to give him.

These three men, William Boherty, Gerald O'Keefe, and Andrew McClellan, still hold positions in the international labor movement. Only the man who masterminded the coup, Edward McKabe, no longer works through the trade union movement.

Guyana was not the only successful CIA operation in Latin America. There were successful coups in Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay and in Chile, all installing regimes friendly to the United States.

Guyana and Iran were genuine undercover operations involving only a few CIA agents and conducted in a subtle enough way to remain hidden. But the subtle approach was not enough to deal with a major crisis much nearer home, in Cuba. In the last of our three examples of how the CIA tried to topple governments, we show how they mounted their own invasion. Fidel Castro's takeover of Cuba in 1959 presented America with its greatest security problem, a Communist government just ninety miles off the coast of Florida. President Eisenhower faced a dilemma. World opinion would not tolerate an open invasion by U.S. troops, so the CIA did it instead.

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They hired a secret army and tried to invade themselves. Their biggest-ever operation turned into the Bay of Pigs fiasco. It showed what happened to the agency when it ignored its basic rule of secrecy.

SPEAKER: I think the man who probably pushed it harder than anybody else was Richard Nixon, who was then Vice President of the United States and a member of the National Security Council. He worked very hard to get it done, and it is often said that he wanted to get it done before the election of 1962 -- pardon me, 1960, when he was running against Kennedy. He wanted to get it done before that so that he could point in the election to how much he was -- had been instrumental in knocking off the Communists.

NIXON: The plans to support the training of Cuban refugees so that they could eventually return to their homeland and free that country of dictatorial rule began under President Eisenhower's Administration. I was a strong supporter of those plans.

SPEAKER: Didn't make it. Didn't take place until the Kennedy Administration. And on the other hand, it is said that Kennedy rather worried about refusing to go ahead with the operation because he knew Richard Nixon might criticize him for it.

NARRATOR: In the summer of 1960, the CIA began hiring its secret army in Miami from among the Cuban exiles who had fled from Castro. The idea was that the CIA would arm and train a force of 1500 men and land them at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. A provisional government would be set up on the beach which the U.S. would immediately recognize. But right from the start, the secret began to leak out.

The CIA's man in Miami responsible for hiring and forming the new provisional government was Howard Hunt. Twelve years later he would be convicted for his part in another fiasco, the Watergate break-in for President Nixon.

HUNT: I was responsible, to some extent, for the recruitment of fighting men for the brigade. I had to effect a harmony, at least that would -- political harmony that would endure through the invasion. I had to form a provisional government that would be acceptable to the broad spectrum of the Cuban people. And I think I was successful.

NARRATOR: But with all this activity going on in the Miami area, the plan began to attract the U.S. press. The fact that this news film was taken of the Cuban brigade training in

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Miami nights before the invasion shows the plan was no longer secret.

REPORTER: What are you doing...

BRIGADE MEMBER: Well, it seems to me to be some sort of job that has to be done in Cuba, and the United States cannot take an active part in it. We might say we're the ones(?) that are spearheading that drive to rid Cuba of Communists. It's a little bit too close to our shores.

REPORTER: You're not backed by CIA or any organization, are you?

BRIGADE MEMBER: Well, I might -- I've heard rumors to that effect, but nobody can prove it.

INTERVIEWER: I think it must have been clear. I mean news leaks were coming out all the time.

INTERVIEWEE: It was very clear that it was going to come, yes. The New York Times, Newsweek, Time magazine, most of the major news journals and news media of the country had a substantial number of personnel going to the Miami area.

NARRATOR: The CIA even supplied the Cuban exiles with a secret air force of B-26 bombers, which were used to bomb Castro's airfields on the day of the invasion.

The invasion was to work like this. On the first day, the CIA's planes would strike from Nicaragua and destroy Castro's air force on the ground in Havana. Two days later, the invasion fleet carrying the army of 1500 Cubans would land at the Bay of Pigs.

But the CIA's plan went wrong right from the start. The B-26 attacks destroyed most of Castro's air force on the ground in Havana, but some of the planes escaped. This would prove crucial later.

To explain the raid, one CIA pilot was instructed to land in Miami to give the press a cover story that he had defected from Castro's air force and carried out the air strike. But the plane had not been involved in the raid at all. It was a CIA decoy. One enterprising journalist noted that its guns were still taped up when it landed. The CIA's bizarre cover story for the invasion was already coming unstuck.

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SPEAKER: Well, when an aircraft, supposedly having strafed Cuba and arrived with its guns taped up, that's hardly a successful way to go about your cover.

SECOND SPEAKER: Well, certainly in any intelligence agency you are always at the mercy of your agent. And in this case, the agent who was the pilot of that aircraft, failed.

NARRATOR: Next, there was a major political embarrassment. Later that day, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Adlai Stevenson, gave his government's official version of America's non-involvement in the raid, unaware that the CIA had planned it all.

STEVENSON: They were piloted by Cuban air force pilots. These pilots and certain other crewmembers have apparently defected from Castro's tyranny. No United States personnel participated.

NARRATOR: The result, humiliation for the U.N. because one of its ambassadors was caught repeating a lie in public.

But the CIA's invasion was by now in serious trouble on the ground in Cuba. The CIA pilots had failed to destroy all of Castro's planes in the first air strike. But with the attentions of the world press on the mysterious plane that was landed in Miami and the fiasco in the U.N., President Kennedy ordered the CIA to call off a second air strike intended to destroy the remaining Castro planes.

Without support of the air, the invading forces were doomed before they hit the beaches. Castro's tiny air force of jets quickly wiped out the CIA's air cover of lumbering B-26 bombers, leaving Castro free to counterattack with tanks.

The CIA brigade leader, Manuel Artinez, explains how the Cubans had to land on the beach without air support.

ARTINEZ: I always remember one of the things that the officer, American officer that gave us the greeting, tell us. The skies will be yours. We received only one message in the ship, that the first bombing destroyed ninety percent of the Cuban air force.

NARRATOR: The CIA brigade was cut to pieces on the beaches.

ARTINEZ: Well, they have 50,000 people against us. We were only 1,400. They have at least one hundred tanks. We have five small tanks. They have heavy artillery, 120 millimeters, 27 kilometer range. They have only mortars.

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NARRATOR: The invading force was slowly being pushed back into the sea, and in the next two days four hundred men died on the beaches. The remainder, like Manuel Arrascaeta, were captured and held prisoner by Castro. The CIA had mounted a vast operation which had no chance of success. It had violated all the basic CIA rules of secrecy.

SPEAKER: Well, I think it went wrong, first, because it -- I don't see how it could have gone right. It was not a -- it was not a covert operation. It was the sort of thing that, if it were going to be done, it should have been done by the United States Army or the Marines should have landed and there should have been either a declaration of war or some declaration of national emergency which might give us an excuse for invading another country. But it was certainly not a thing that could ever be done as a covert operation.

INTERVIEWER: What was the...

SPEAKER: Again, it was this idea that we have -- it's what happened to the agency. It just got too big and it got too grandiose, and it's ideas were too big, its goals were too high.

NARRATOR: In the private recriminations that followed the fiasco, the CIA men blamed the failure on President Kennedy for not ordering the second air strike. Kennedy himself was furious. Because of the CIA, his new Administration had been seen intervening in an attempt to overthrow Cuba. Determined to break the power of the CIA, the President replaced Director Allen Dulles with a businessman, John McCone. He also asked his brother Robert Kennedy to investigate the CIA.

SPEAKER: John Kennedy intended, I think, to smash the agency into a thousand pieces, and the man he appointed to do the job, his brother, Robert Kennedy, was absolutely fascinated by the agency, spellbound by the agency. Once he got into it and investigated it and found out what it was, he loved it. He loved physical fitness, he loved the idea of paratroopers and guerillas and people who could climb mountains and exist for days on a cup of water. Everything about the agency fascinated him, and as a result of his fascination the agency grew in power and went on into Laos and Vietnam.

NARRATOR: Robert Kennedy's interest and a new need for the CIA in the coming Vietnam war saved the agency from the full consequences of the Bay of Pigs disaster.

SPEAKER: The CIA has men who very easily constitute a kind of power elite for imperial presidents such as we had in Richard Nixon and in Lyndon Johnson. They are a kind of praetorian guard. They ask no questions. When they get an order, whether it be an order for assassination or a war, they're not accustomed to asking questions. They do it.

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NARRATOR: Throughout the 1960s, American Presidents like Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon increased the power of the presidency at the expense of the elected Congress. Indeed, by 1969, when President Nixon made this visit to its headquarters, the Central Intelligence Agency was waging on his behalf a fullscale war in Laos.

In Indochina the CIA found themselves matched against the toughest communists in the Third World, the North Vietnamese, and they were forced to fight a fullscale war in secret in Laos.

SPEAKER: We had signed a truce that said that we would stay out of Laos, and the Communists had signed a truce saying they would stay out of Laos, and neither one of us did. And it was impossible to go to the American people and say we're going back into -- we're going to Laos with troops. So we just did it secretly.

NARRATOR: Under the Geneva agreement of 1962, Laos, next-door to Vietnam, should have stayed neutral, but Communist guerilla activity continued. President Kennedy needed the CIA to prop up the shaky Lao Government, but he did so without telling Congress. In theory the supreme political bobby. The scale of the CIA's secret war in Laos increased rapidly and it took the American Congress seven years to find out what was going on.

The secret war was run from this building, the CIA headquarters in Vientienne, the capital of Laos. But secret wars need secret armies, so the CIA first backed a force of 30,000 Lao tribesmen from the hills, then stiffened them later with 15,000 more troops from neighboring Thailand.

The CIA man became the discreet general to this -- this army in the field.

To supply its secret army, the CIA created a civilian front to run a fleet of planes and helicopters, Air America, which eventually employed 500 men inside Laos.

The CIA also had the problem of shipping great quantities of munitions [?] and equipment into a country supposedly neutral. As a cover, they used a humanitarian organization, AID, the Agency for International Development.

In later years, as the military situation worsened, the CIA had to set up their air strike force, the 56th Special Operations Wing. A thousand men worked for this secret air force inside Laos.

By 1971, when the war was at this height, there were still only 200 CIA agents in Laos, but they had in active service and in support a total of 93,500 men. This massive involvement had

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developed without the knowledge of Congress. The agents, like these men who ran the operation, reported back each day their chiefs in America, who were under the political control of men like Henry Kissinger, who was himself responsible to President Nixon.

Tom McCoy ran the CIA's political and psychological operation in Laos just after the war began.

INTERVIEWER: Technically, the CIA was in the country illegally.

McCOY: Well, illegally -- illegally, according to what legality is, I don't know. We were not there illegally, as far as the -- as far as the Lao Government was concerned.

NARRATOR: Ron Rickenback was a non-CIA employee at AID, the American relief agency. He was later to tell Congress how AID was used as an agency front.

INTERVIEWER: How secret was the CIA operation in Laos?

RICKENBACK: Secrecy was preserved -- well, in terms of the international press or the American press, it was effectively preserved for a great length of time. If there were agency people working in Laos, if they were ever to leave the country, for the most part they would leave by American aircraft and fly directly into Thailand without passing through normal Laotian governmental passport channels. They would never have been reflected on the customs rolls as having gone in and out of the country.

NARRATOR: One vital aim of the operation in Laos was to block the North Vietnamese, who were also violating the country's neutrality by using it as an infiltration route to the war in South Vietnam. The Communists were harrassed for ten years, but in process the CIA's army of Mao hill tribesman was almost wiped out.

RICKENBACK: As time went on, the attrition took its toll and thousands upon thousands of -- of people died or were maimed and were no longer capable of fighting, and this led to ever greater inducements of air power or financial bribery, or whatever, to keep this operation going. It got to the point, the ludicrous point, of where ten-year-old or nine-year-old hill tribes children were being conscripted into the service and whoi were being charged to fight, which was -- which was totally out of control at that point.

INTERVIEWER: Do you ever feel any guilt about the number of people that died in that war?

McCOY: No, I don't, because I think that that's what happens in wars. Had the Mao people not chosen to defend their own turf, they -- we would not have been involved with them. And when

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you go into help people to do something which they want to do, then I don't really think that you feel very -- have any reason to feel guilty because some of them got hurt in the process.

NARRATOR: As its army began to lose ground, the CIA was forced to step up its bombing operation in Laos. But first they used their own 56th Special Operations Wing of light bombers controlled by them in Laos.

The next stage was the issue of U.S. B-52's and fighter-bombers from neighboring Thailand. The bombing had begun in 1965, but it was four years before Congress was told that American planes were bombing Laos. Even then it didn't stop. By the end of the war in 1973, two million tons of bombs had been dropped in the whole of World War II.

Fred Bronsman spent four years in Laos, first with AID, and later as a journalist.

INTERVIEWER: Now, this war started in 1962. When did Congress first find out about it?

BRONSMAN: September '69 that they first laid out a part of what they were doing in Laos. Ambassador Sullivan did, the U.S. Ambassador to Laos. What was quite interesting in the September, '69 testimony, that is seven and a half years after they began, is that at one point Senator Fulbright says to Sullivan, "Listen, you testified last year and you didn't tell me that the United States was bombing Laos." And Fulbright says, "Well, how can I ask you if I didn't know it?"

7 The one time in the history of the American Republic that the United States Congress was attempted to control the CIA was when it passed a law in 1971 forbidding the CIA to hire Thai troops to fight in Laos. The CIA proceeded to not only ignore the law, but increased the number of Thais from something like 5,000 all the way to 20,000 by the end of '72.

NARRATOR: In 1973, a congressional committee was finally able to question William Toby, the man who had been in charge of the CIA's Indochina operations, about what the agency had done in Laos.

Senator Symington: "What can you really call the CIA, then, is 'the King's men' or 'the President's army.'"

William Toby: "I do not think this is the case, Mr. Chairman. I think the CIA is an intelligence agency."

Senator Symington: "I know, you know, that much of the CIA operation in Laos has as much to do with intelligence as the production of carpets in the United States. This is what worries

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the American people. They find something going on for years, killing a lot of people about which they had no idea."

NARRATOR: When the secret war ended in 1973 with the Paris peace agreement, Laos was devastated. On the American side, an estimated 150,000 people had been killed. No Laos has effectively been taken over by the Communist guerrillas, the Pathet Lao. The cost to the American taxpayer, who didn't know it was happening, was two billion dollars. The CIA judged the secret war a success. The CIA strategy had allowed them to harass the North Vietnamese and prop up a shaky ally for as long as the Vietnam war continued.

Strangely enough, this other war next-door in Vietnam was opposed by some CIA men whose intelligence suggested it was unwinnable. They now claim that the agency was dragged into Vietnam by successive Presidents to play second-fiddle to the Army.

SPEAKER: One of the problems of the American Army in Vietnam was that the Secretary of Defense tended to quantify everything. Robert McNamara believed in figures. He came from the Ford Motor Company had he knew exactly how Edsels could be sold and how many couldn't be sold, and he asked for body-counts. That was what the Americans had to do in Vietnam, take body-counts. Now, if you ask somebody how many bodies there are out there, he's likely to exaggerate. In the first place; in the second place, by the time it gets down to the poor soldier who has to go out and count the bodies, he'd probably rather stay in his foxhole and estimate. But McNamara would sit in his office with all his figures, neatly toted up, and say we are winning the war.

I remember that Daly (?) Fitzgerald, the CIA man who was originally in charge of Vietnam, went in to see McNamara one day and said to him, "You know, I have the feeling that we are losing the war." And McNamara said, "Do you mean you go on feel? I go on figures."

NARRATOR: The CIA intelligence men realized early in the war that the U.S. military strategy of massive firepower wasn't countering the hit-and-run tactics of a guerrilla enemy. So they came up with their own plan to win the war: Operation Phoenix.

During the war the Communist had practiced selective assassination of suspect village headmen. But Operation Phoenix was to become a killing machine, designed specifically to wipe out Communist sympathizers at grass-root levels. And to prove to the military that Operation Phoenix was effective, the CIA was also drawn into the dubious business of body-counts. The operation now stands out as one of the grasiest episodes of the whole bloody Vietnam war, a mass assassination program.

The CIA plan worked like this. A CIA agent would take

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charge of Operation Phoenix in a particular part of the country. Under him, were Americans from military intelligence whose job was to recruit the network of Vietnamese agents. These men were supposed to discover the names of suspected Vietcong supporters. South Vietnamese provisional reconnaissance units then went into villages to capture or kill these suspects.

A military intelligence officer in Operation Phoenix, Barton Osborne, later worked for the CIA. He has now testified before Congress on the effects of Operation Phoenix.

INTERVIEWER: What was the quality of the intelligence which led to the arrest of the Vietcong, do you think?

OSBORNE: Very poor. There were arrests that were made on no collaboration, one report with another. Quite often I found my reports being submitted for one person located in one spot at one time and being either assassinated on the spot or brought in for interrogation and tortured to death, without any second opinions whatsoever.

So I found example in my own nets (?) of Vietnamese reporting people to whom they owed money or had longstanding family fights or had had personal arguments by just turning the names over to their control for neutralization of the individual with whom they had some disagreement.

We had one agent down in To Kin province, south of Da Dang, who was neutralized because he was reported by another agent in another cell as being under suspicion as a VC because his activities were irregular. And when he was assassinated then I had quite a problem covering that up in paperwork.

INTERVIEWER: How much killing went on at this local level?

OSBORNE: A good bit. At one point it was the majority. I would say in the spring of '68 it was the majority of people because there was simply an awful overcrowding of the province interrogation centers. The process of bringing these people in an interrogating them, the process of even considering legal recourse, was just too overpowering, when you consider the mania of the body-count and the quotas assigned for DCI and neutralization. So quite often it was a matter of expediency just to eliminate the person in the field, rather than deal with the paperwork.

INTERVIEWER: Were they paid to produce bodies?

OSBORNE: Yes, quite liberally. Of course at the height of the body-count mania your point of success in the neutralization of the VCI, VC infrastructure, was the body-count. It was one of the only indexes we had in a muddled situation. People who were just implicit (?) were good for ten thousand or more plasters on

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on the presentation of a head or an ID card or an ear to identify them.

INTERVIEWER: Who was going the counting?

OSBORNE: The CIA representatives in Da Nang that I knew of, out of an office called the Phoenix Coordinator's Office, which was attached to the consulate under the CIA.

NARRATOR: Burton Osborne was only one of the intelligence men who gave evidence to the committee of Congress investigation in 1972 into the CIA's Operation Phoenix. Its conclusions were"

"The committee is concerned about Phoenix's highly questionable intelligence-gathering procedures, its unprecise methods of targeting suspected Vietcong for neutralization, and serious moral considerations of U.S. support for a program that has allegedly included torture, murder and inhumane treatment to South Vietnamese civilians.

NARRATOR: William Toby, now Director of the CIA, was responsible for the assassination program in Vietnam from 1967. He told a congressional committee that twenty thousand, five hundred Vietnamese were killed in three years during Operation Phoenix. He admitted that many of those murdered might have been innocent.

INTERVIEWER: Of that figure of 20,500 what percentage do you think were killed and were they innocent?

NAM: I have no way of knowing. I have the feeling that it was the majority because it was a very wild kind of program. There were an awful lot of vendettas being carried out with Phoenix license.

NARRATOR: In November, 1969, an event was reported which shocked America. In a village called My Lai, a company of American soldiers had massacred 347 villagers, including women and children. What was not made public was the role of the CIA's Operation Phoenix, which was responsible for telling the American patrol that My Lai was a Vietcong village. The wave of public revulsion of Ly Lai helped create the political mood in America which hastened the end of the war.

But the CIA was to be involved in another episode which also profoundly shocked America. That fatal clip, which seems almost trivial in the context of its past, was the agency's involvement, through Richard Nixon, with Watergate.

SPEAKER: One of the causes of the downfall of Richard Nixon is that he saw this thing at his right hand which was an instrument for deceit, and he thought, I've got a brilliant idea, he thought, why not use it domestically. I've got some problems

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right here at home, and here is something that I can't-- that was built to take care of foreign enemies, let's take care of my domestic ones, too.

NARRATOR: History came back to haunt Richard Nixon and the CIA in the person of Howard Hunt, the former CIA agent, and an architect of the disastrous invasion of Cuba in 1961. In 1972, Hunt was found to have masterminded the Watergate burglary for Nixon, using CIA veterans from Cuba and CIA equipment.

INTERVIEWER: What general assistance did you get from the CIA in relation to Watergate?

HUNT: No direct assistance at all. There were some documents, that is, items of disguise, that the men used when they actually made the entry into the Watergate premises.

INTERVIEWER: And these were given to you by the CIA?

HUNT: That had been provided by the CIA to the White House...

INTERVIEWER: ...visit to the CIA headquarters at any time?

HUNT: In connection with a prior operation. I didn't say the West Coast operation.

NARRATOR: Watergate forced the resignation of Richard Nixon and Howard Hunt was jailed.

But the CIA didn't escape the remorseless process of investigation which was set in train. Late last year the post-Watergate insistence on open government unearthed another damaging episode. The CIA had secretly backed the forces which brought down the leftwing government of President Allende in Chile in 1973.

The CIA successfully financed Allende's opponents for 15 years. But in 1970 they miscalculated his support and did little to help the opposition. Allende, a Marxist, won by a small majority in a democratic election.

Secretary of State Kissinger was disturbed. With President Nixon's agreement, he ordered an economic squeeze on Chile. The CIA also went into action behind the scenes, and in the next three years millions of dollars were spent in efforts to undermine Allende.

But before these facts came out, Richard Helms, the CIA Director during the Chile campaign, had testified on oath before Congress that the agency played no part in Allende's downfall.

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MAN: When he stood up before this Senate to testify and he was asked certain questions about his operations in Chile; he was asked, "Did you spend any money to overthrow the Allende government?" And he said, "No, sir." They asked if he had conducted any overt activities against the Allende government and he said, "No sir," and for that he probably, in the post-Watergate era will be indicted for perjury. That decision we'll learn about in a few weeks. It was shortly after he made that statement, his predecessor, Colby went up to Congress and told them the truth.

INTERVIEWER: How did this come about, this turn-about in policy?

MAN: Watergate. Richard Helms is going by the old CIA tradition, which is that, if necessary, the Director will openly lie.

NARRATOR: CIA's involvement in covert acts in the frist Watergate atmosphere, even secret services aren't allowed secrets. William Colby, the new Director of the CIA had told the Congressional Committee in strictest confidence how the agency had, indeed, spent eight million dollars financing opposition to Allende. So enraged was Congressman Michael Harrington, that he leaked Colby's secret testimony to the press and exposed the earlier deception.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON: I went in prepared to accept the ground rules, secrecy, but it was obviously of such pronounced variance with what both I had believed and what the American public had been told, I think it's very important, and still do, that in some fashion, preferably without the distraction of how it was released, to get the American public to understand what we did in the context of a country like Chile, not in the mid-fifties, but in the early 1970s.

NARRATOR: The secret information given to Harrington was so that the CIA's so-called Dirty Tricks Department was active in Chile; first in a bid to stop the endorsement of Allende, who's scraped home so narrowly, the CIA earmarked three hundred and fifty thousand dollars to bribe Chilean Congressmen. That plan failed and Allende became President. The CIA then set about undermining him, they helped finance demonstrations by middle-class women who beat pots and pans outside Allende's house each day. They also financed more sinister groups, like the right wing terrorist group Fatherland and Freedom Fighters which blew up bridges, radio transmitter, and caused riots. When the Capitalists had finally paved the way for Allende's overthrow, it was the one used successfully by the CIA for Guiana ten years before, a prolonged strike; this time by Chilean loyalists. Two thousand seven hundred miles long, Chile is totally dependent on road transport. The result of chaos. The strikers stayed out for six years, subsidized secretly by the CIA.

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The chaos of the CIA-backed strike gave Allende's opponents in the Chilean armed forces the excuse they needed; the Presidential palace was bombed. Allende died inside. Some fifteen thousand Socialists were murdered by the military regime, now of the most repressive in Latin America.

MAN: I think it was a mistake for us because it was a terrible embarrassment for this to come out. I think we paid for it in shame and in loss of dignity.

INTERVIEWER: Who, in fact, ran the...

MAN: Dr. Kissinger ran the Chilean operation, very much like a guest officer. He's that way, he likes to do things himself.

NARRATOR: After Chile brought discredit to the agency, it was then to be greatly embarrassed by the allegations that it's been involved in assassinations of foreign leaders and attempts on the lives of Cuba's Fidel Castro and others. Bay of Pigs veteran, Howard Hunt:

HUNT: The time that I was dispatched to Havana at the beginning of our anti-Castro project, Castro'd been in power only a couple of months. Even so, my conversations with the man in the street persuaded me that, among other things, that there was enough of a charisma attached to Castro that for an armed invasion to be successful that he would have to be assassinated.

NARRATOR: Colonel Fletcher Prouty served as liaison officer between the U.S. military and the CIA; he supplied equipment for the CIA assassination attempt against Castro.

HUNT: There's one that I can tell you very positively about because in working regularly with Dick Helms' office on these missions into Cuba, we were told one day that they had two men, an assassination team, ready to be delivered near Havana, that these men were equipped with high powered rifle, telescopic sights, and that they knew a building that they could have an opportunity to fire at Castro. When we were ready to run the flight, the CIA put two of their mercenary pilots in the plane and they flew the plane to Cuba to a certain road near Havana. The plane had the capability of landing short on a road. The plane came back, it landed at Eglin, and we recovered it, the pilots came with it, but they had left the two people in Cuba. Those two men had been told by the CIA to go ahead and assassinate Castro.

INTERVIEWER: What happened, do you thing?

MAN: Well, as far as we in the military were concerned, we never heard of them again.

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MAN: There is no doubt that what some of the activities of the CIA had exceeded the law.

NARRATOR: Senator Frank Church is now leading a powerful Senate investigation which will ask tough questions about allegations of CIA involvement in the deaths of men like President Diem of South Vietnam in 1963, President Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic in 1961, Patrice Lumumba of the Congo in the same year, and unsuccessful attempts on the lives of Fidel Castro of Cuba, which involved the Mafia; Archbishop Nicholas of Cyprus in 1971; and President DuValier of Haiti twice in the 1960's.

Richard Helms, who was the CIA's Director of Clandestine Operations during much of this period, testified last month before the Senate Committee, then came out to face the press looking shaken.

HELMS: As far as I know the CIA was never responsible for assassinating any foreign leaders.

MAN: (Unintelligible)

HELMS: I don't know whether I stop beating my wife or you stop beating your wife (unintelligible) everything under the sun.

MAN: You're not answering my question.

HELMS: I'm not trying to answer your question.

NARRATOR: If Senator Church does reveal more CIA secrets it could embarrass the government and further stain the reputation of America abroad. Only a society of openness in post-Watergate America could endure such self-criticism. No doubt, too, such disclosures will give comfort to closed societies like the Soviet Union whose spy force, the KGB, may be just as ruthless as the CIA without any fear of democratic exposure.

The final report by Senator Church may curb the CIA's great power, but ironically, 1976 is America's two hundredth birthday a year set aside for rededication to the Constitution, whose First Amendment is claimed as a guarantee of free speech, even by ex-spies. Although it is one of the most open Constitutions in theory, it is now being practiced at the expense of its best-kept secrets; the astonishing role of the Central Intelligence Agency in world affairs.

INTERVIEWER: As a former CIA man, what do you think should happen in the agency?

MAN: I think it should be cut back. I think it could be half, or less than half. Maybe a tenth of the size it is. I would have a small tool shed somewhere and I would have the men in that tool shed run the spies all over the world, and there needn't be more than two or three hundred of them, and, as the

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British do, I would have a few people who are, I think the British call them operatives, who are able to carry out tasks of daring-do secretly and well. But there would be so few of them that they would no longer be -- it would no longer be suggested that we move in armies in Southeast Asia countries or Latin American countries.

INTERVIEWER: Hasn't America got a peculiar dilemma in running a secret operation like the CIA when Americans love, most of all, openness and democracy and freedom of expression? There is something fundamentally contradictory between that side of American political belief and running his huge, secret operation.

MAN: Yeah. It's a serious question whether democracy can run a secret agency and to some extent there will always -- the two will always be at sword points, the secret agency can't possibly be in the democratic tradition. I don't know how you get around that. In England you have an official Secrets Act: we don't because we have the First Amendment.

I don't know whether it can be done. I would say the experiment so far has been a failure. We haven't done it well.

ANNOUNCER: The preceding program was produced and made by British Broadcasting, United Television and broadcast over the British Commercial Television Network. We finish to note that since that time Richard Helms, former Director of the CIA, now Ambassador to Iran, has not been indicted for perjury as was speculated in one of the interviews. Naturally, we have no control over the production of these reports and because of the nature of intelligence, cannot document their content. We invited the CIA to respond to the program, but the invitation was declined by William Colby, the agency's Director.